Issues and Dilemmas of
Multi-Party Democracy in Africa
by
Seyoum Hameso
Introduction
Decades of military rule and
authoritarian regimes were gradually yielding to a new era of
democracy, and popular participation in governance began to emerge.
During the last decade, some 42 African countries have held
multi-party presidential or parliamentary elections, with mixed
results (ADB 2001:99).
A unique African democracy is not something which will emerge from a
rational blueprint, Claude Ake noted nearly a decade ago; it will emerge
from practical experience and improvisation in the course of a hard
struggle. The “rational blueprint” he had in mind was the liberal
multiparty democracy, in which political participation and exclusion
stem from periodic elections with many parties contesting for votes cast
on individual basis (one-person, one-vote). Robert Dahl (1989:221)
described three essential conditions for a multiparty democracy to
function. These are: a) extensive competition by contestants including
individuals, groups or parties for government; b) political
participation that provides the choice for the electorate to select
candidates in free and fair elections; and, c) civil and political
liberties that enable citizens to express themselves without fear of
punishment.
Given a situation where all the above conditions are met, competitive
politics culminate in majoritarian rule. Historically, such a
system “had evolved in economically, industrially, politically and
socially complex state systems” (Skinner 2000:57).
Problems abound when these conditions do not obtain in the social and
economic world of political actors or when multiparty politics is taken
in its minimalist dimension. The “minimalist approach” is traceable to
Joseph Schumpeter who observed that democracy does not entail rule by
the people but it is “a method by which decision-making is transferred
to individuals who have gained power in a competitive struggle for the
votes of the citizens” (Schumpeter 1942; Cranenburgh 2000:22).
This approach is simplistic in view of Africa’s complex problems
where, because of inadequate consensus on democratic norms and values as
well as insufficient counter-pressure from society, political regimes
fail to give adequate heed to elite abuse, ethnic fears of majoritarian
tyranny, corruption, and legitimate group demand for political and
social rights. Even with competitive elections, the possibility remains
that political and ethnic minorities will be excluded from the political
process and face an insecure future (Rothchild 2000:11).
Stephen Ellis pointed that it was a great error “to believe that the
principle of the sovereignty of the popular will, to be tested Â…
through general elections, was replacing all other principles of
sovereignty throughout the world, and moreover that was necessary for
any country which wished to develop” (Ellis 2000:39). The stark reality
in many cases is the practice of multiparty elections whereby autocratic
rulers remain in office using “electoral procedures as rituals to divide
and rule and stay in power” (Abbink 2000:2).
During the Cold War era, the priority by Western states for economic
and national ties meant that corrupt regimes elsewhere were supported
despite their record on human rights violations and absence of
democracy. When the Cold War was over, governments made reluctant moves
to multiparty democracy. Reluctance in itself was a pointer of the
fragility of the basis for competitive politics. While politicians in
power viewed multipartyism with suspicion, academics too contested its
validity. It is argued that, born and bred in the industrial West,
multiparty politics is not the best fit for Africa where socio-political
structures and potent identification are more of ethnicity and less of
classes (Hameso 1997b; 2001).
This paper advances the debate on the appropriateness of multiparty
politics in Africa. The starting point is an inquiry into the background
to democratisation of African polities followed by the examination of
the dilemmas facing multiparty democracy in African setting and the
search for alternative approaches.
Issues
The mixed results that accompanied political trials and tribulations
in Africa led to perverse perception of Africa’s key institutions. Some
have openly lamented about the criminalization of state, the politics of
the belly, and disorder as political instrument. Others have condemned
corrupt leaders, manipulative elite and uncivil nationalism (Bayart et
al 1999; Bayart 1993; Chabal and Daloz 2000; Berman 1998). The
criminalization of societies takes the form of negative perception about
ethnicity or people as collective groups and their quest for
participation and representation. Popular liberation struggles are
portrayed, particularly by the media, as terrorism or tribal warfare
without reference to historical, economic, and socio-political
background.
No wonder if the imposition or reluctant adoption of MPP failed to
provide substantive answers to the myriad of problems facing Africa
including economic decline, intense conflicts, inadequate channels of
political communication, and lack of responsive political institutions (Rothchild
2000:11). On occasions, the problems were intensified giving rise to
questions as to how the neo-liberal precepts take African realities into
consideration.
One such reality is an overwhelming diversity. A continent
three times the size of the United States has fifty-three states. Its
800 million people trace their roots from over 2000 different ethnic
groups with different languages of their own. The slave trade and
colonial rule have perversely affected Africa’s development
possibilities. Arbitrary and illogical carving of the boundaries
irrespective of the social and natural divisions of geography and
population settlement harnessed profound national identity crisis, not
to mention the potential for intra- and inter-state conflicts.
Later, the process of controlled decolonization failed in the
re-formation of generally acceptable polities. The inherited states
remained weak, imposed, and coercive machinery run by force than by
consent. The host of factors that hindered the development of the
Gramscian “organic intellectuals” and institutions also delayed the
development of vibrant nationalism and nation states that were the
trustees of progress in the West.
In short, the states and the political systems remained much in the
making of the colonial order, swimming in the sea of conquest
politics. The post-independence leaders took over the political
kingdom in its enticing form. Well versed with repressive and oppressive
past, they embraced the single party system as an essential mode of
rule. Political plurality and ethnic diversity were decried as
bottlenecks for the project of “nation-building” and national unity.
Arrested, in the process, was the growth of vibrant social, political
and economic institutions. Traversing across a range of crises, states
have nearly lost the legitimacy so necessary for sensible governance.
The transfer of power turned out to be a matter of rebellion and it took
military coups d’etat or more lately the growing ranks of
rebellion armies. In effect, the political foundation of the
post-colonial states became military autocracy, personal rule or the
combination of both.
The motive behind single party system and the reasons for political
regimes to pursue such a route was historical, political and
ideological. The familiar historical legacy that preceded independence
was the rule of minority over majority, and that was not democracy.
Moreover, colonial rule undermined local and indigenous values and
institutions without creating a stable replacement. Politically, amid
cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, the sustenance of power
and territorial unity took priority, which seemed to require unitarist,
single party state. Ideologically, the development model from China and
the then Soviet Union offered ideological justification to maintain
authoritarian, one party states. For this purpose, the immediate past
was easily replayed as political authoritarianism complemented economic
authoritarianism, and both backed by the post-independence development
ideology.
Development economists, sympathetic to state-led development and
dominant ‘modernization’ theories readily acknowledged that economic
development came first with democratisation expected to follow
laterÂ…. Former colonial powers were less interested in democracy
than in preserving their economic advantages and privileged
connections in their former colonies. Global strategists wanted
reliable clients in the great game of the Cold War. The human rights
movement was still weak and scattered, and gave scant attention to
Africa (Young 1996:54).
In order to complement the above scenario, the argument for
authoritarianism had it that the political economy of development poses
a “cruel choice” between rapid economic growth and democratic processes
(Bhagwati 1966:204). Lately, the same author reversed his position
stating that the “cruel choice is by no means a compelling necessity Â…
either democracy does not handicap development or in the best of
circumstances, it even promotes it” (Bhagwati 1995:3).
In real politics, the major powers, preoccupied with the Cold War,
saw authoritarian, often military, rule appropriate for clientelism and
political stability. They did not seriously recommend the need for
multiparty elections and democracy in the then Zaire or South Africa.
The Cold War rivalry has, in fact, nourished corrupt dictatorship in
Zaire, Somalia, Ethiopia, Liberia and elsewhere in Africa.
With the end of the Cold War, the challenge to authoritarian polity
emerged from within and without. Economic and social discontent
compelled outspoken individuals to criticise governments for presiding
over economic decline and political decay. While the globalisation of
ideas inspired citizens to demand political liberties, rebellion groups
fought against marginalization removing dictatorship in a score of
countries including Somalia, Ethiopia and Liberia. Externally,
structural adjustment measures and the donors’ conditioning of foreign
aid to the pursuit of “good governance” forced governments to introduce
political reforms.
The democratisation wave was replenished by the controversial end
of history as representing “the end point of mankind’s ideological
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the
final form of human government” (Fukiyama 1989:4). Multiparty democracy
was then promoted as an alternative to single party, personal and
military rule. Such promotion, however, was conducted on the background
of the following features of the political economy of post-independence
Africa.
The Nature of State, Political Rule and Opposition
Many an African post-colonial states hovered over societies without
having strong links to the communities they ruled. Most remained aloof,
therefore, weak and paradoxically strong in terms of their repressive
structures which produced unresponsive social and economic mechanisms.
The relationship between state and society was not generally positive as
most governments were noted to “pursue and advance primarily the
interests and objectives of a few individuals and groups – mostly those
of the ruling elites and their supporters” (Mbaku 2000).
The choice of a single party rule meant that opposition was
unthinkable or when it existed it was frequently equated with an act of
treason. Political opponents were presented as anti-people and enemies
of the nation. An example against opposition is found in wittingly
descriptive argument from Malawi: “There is no opposition in heaven. God
himself does not want opposition – that is why he chased Satan away. Why
should Kamuzu have opposition?” (Decalo 1992:10). Equating the
“political kingdom” with heaven, the Malawian leaders rendered
opposition despicable. In describing the prevailing mood in Nigeria,
Chinua Achebe noted “that all argument should cease and the whole people
speak with one voice and that any more dissent and argument outside the
door of the shelter would subvert and bring down the whole house” (Achebe
1967:37).
Thus opposition and dissent came to entail severe punishment and
repression. In some cases, opposition mete out with physical elimination
and liquidation as in Ethiopia of the 1970s and 1980s, the period also
known by White and Red Terror. Strange enough, even terror was
officially sanctioned to have a colour!
Ruthless autocratic regimes and their rulers criminalized dissent by
portraying opposition leaders and their members or supporters as
criminals, thugs and sometimes terrorists. Opposition itself took
different forms both peaceful and violent. The latter occurs under
circumstances where the former is impossible. As Ted Gurr noted, it is
part of human being’s constitution that if frustration, dissatisfaction,
and grievance are sufficiently prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is
quite likely, if not certain to occur (Gurr 1971; 1993).
Constitutions and Power Transfer
A constitution is an important social and political contract as it
allows judgment by “the people.” Yet, the contract that existed in the
post-independence Africa was the one received from the colonial era. It
was not consummated through public debate; it was done through secret
dealings. Now that the very stuff of politics or the negotiation over
the distribution of resources in society turned out to be a matter of
coercion than consent. Since coercion breads resistance, violence and
military threat remained ever present in politics. Violent transfer of
power became the norm, each generation demonising the past and the
forced agreement of its predecessors. An illustrative example is
Ethiopia where three governments produced three constitutions: in the
1930s, 1980s, and 1990s belonging to imperial rule, military rule and
the current government, respectively.
Since independence, Africa experienced numerous coups d’etat
as military rulers seize power with declared intent of correcting the
past misdeeds. Sooner than later, they curtailed civil liberties or
re-wrote constitutions, an action that does not initiate popular
reaction because people were not ready to defend what they did create.
As for governments, these constitutions remain on the shelves gathering
dust or come to prominence for their violations than for observance.
Fragile Media, Illusive Civil Society and the
Resilience of Ethnicity
The media’s role in the conduct of multiparty politics is important
since freedom of expression is a vital condition for free and fair
elections. In the past, personal rulers built their personality cult
using state-owned and controlled media, mainly the radio and sometimes
television. The print media are often confined to towns and this is
linked to low levels of literacy and income. The media thus operate
under strict state control with journalists, editors and writers as
opinion formers living under the fearsome shadow of the Orwellian Big
Brother.
The discussion of civil society remains controversial in matters
pertaining to who are its members and if the civil are adequately
representative of Africa’s societal landscape. If it is assumed that the
term refers to “that segment of society that interacts with the state,
influences the state, and yet is distinct from the state,” (Chazan
1990:281), the question is what sort of organisations or groups
represent these societies in Africa. Are they church groups, NGOs, or
trade unions? Under circumstances where over 70-80% of populations live
in rural areas where illiteracy is rampant, the talk about independent,
organized trade unions, professional associations, and fancy pressure
groups is a fairytale or a romantic search for self-image in another
world. Chabal and Daloz contend that
[t]he notion of civil society would only apply if it could be shown
that there were meaningful institutional separations between a well
organized civil society and a relatively autonomous bureaucratic
state. Instead, what we observe in Â… Africa is the constant
interpretation, or straddling, of the one by the other. Those who
emphasize the role of civil society are thus forced to identify it
very largely as a residual category, including as it were all the
individuals and groups who express dissent. The danger of
emphasizing this supposed opposition between state and civil society
is that it creates the illusion that African political systems are
more similar to their Western counterparts than they really are. Yet
there is on the continent no genuine disconnection between a
structurally differentiated state and a civil society composed of
properly organized and politically distinct interest groups. The
current assumption about the emergence of such a recognizable civil
society in Africa is thus immensely misleading and derives more from
wishful thinking or ideological bias than from a careful analysis of
present conditions (Chabal and Daloz 1999:17-18)
The promotion of civil society, in the West, involves education and
the free flow of information. In Africa, the formation of trade unions,
often related to industrial or related activities, is limited because of
the insignificance of industry in these economies. Trade union leaders
may get co-opted or link themselves with the regime in power at times
becoming part of the state structure. The waged “middle class” is
largely dependent on the state for employment and it is now badly hit by
structural adjustment programmes. Some academics, unable to operate
independently, opt out of the system and flee their countries. And those
who remain and attempt to voice popular discontent face violations of
their rights. In short, vibrant civil society independent of the state
is rare, weak, cowed and confused.
This does not mean, however, that despotic rule went unopposed.
Different social organisations became the catalysts for change among
which organisations that have regional or ethnic basis are paramount.
For various reasons, ethnic identification and ethnicity remain
important elements of life in Africa. During the slave trade, the
protection of the kins against slave raiders was naturally restricted to
kinship. Later, effective opposition to colonial rule also came in the
form of organisations based along ethnic lines. One example is the Mau
Mau movement in Kenya that was based on the Kikuyu people. It is often
the case that people resort to collective mechanisms to deal with the
exigencies that threaten their collective survival. Peter Ekeh concluded
that “if there is judgment that in relative terms the African as an
individual has withstood the turmoil occasioned by the slave trade and
imperialism rather well, then this survival is owed more to the strength
of kinship than to any state organization” (Ekeh 1990:693; Hameso
2001:247-48).
As the contemporary states in Africa increasingly failed in the
protection, support and provision of basic services, people resort to
non-formal arrangements such as “voluntary” ethnic self-help
associations. Thus the resilience of ethnicity becomes distinctly
visible during economic and political crises as it offers protective
shield in the “retreat from urban decline to rural survival in ethnic
homeland” (Shaw 1986:591). This is how the importance and the relevance
of contemporary ethnicity should be understood.
It has become customary for Western creditors, including the World
Bank and the Fund, to emphasise dual reforms, namely, economic
liberalization and “good governance.” It remains important and useful
that political reform is seen as a vital condition for economic reform.
While political reform in the direction of democratisation is a
prerequisite to human development and accountability, the vital issues
that need reckoning are the background to these reforms.
This is particularly the case since a country’s political and
economic transition is a function of its history, culture, tradition,
and economic development. Most African countries rely on the production
and export of raw materials and cash crops; they are also extremely
susceptible to natural hazards and external shocks. They face
unfavourable terms of trade and protectionist measures from
industrialized countries. Many depend on foreign aid, and some on food
handout. Foreign investment is limited to a few countries and selected
sectors such as mining and extractive industries. Political instability
and unfavourable policies meant that Africa’s share of foreign direct
investment has been one of the least compared to other developing
countries (See UNCTAD 1999).
As far as societies in these countries are concerned, people have
neither economic safety net (in terms of state social security systems
such as pensions or supportive benefits – when they are outside the
state employment which is the case with the majority of rural people)
nor political guarantees to protect themselves against ambitious
politicians and warlords. The situation is such that “power can be
possessed all too readily by the stridently vocal and pathologically
ignorant” (Galbraith 1994:177). Moreover, the economic environment of
insecurity, resource scarcity, and poverty leads to desperate search for
access to resources whereas economic decline and inequitable income
distribution worsens social tension. Surely, these are not propitious
grounds for moderation and restraint.
At the same time, the economic incapacity and vulnerability means
that political actors – both the incumbent and those in opposition –
have limited choice in terms of fresh proposals to economic policy
changes. Since the existing strategic policies are already determined
outside Africa by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) without
the consent of the people, the competition among parties will only be on
the basis of which group executes the predetermined policies better.
This is another reality that constrains the process of democratisation
in Africa.
The timing and the combination of political and economic reforms are
not given sufficient attention. The economic reform measures imposed by
IFIs do not take the proper account of social and political background
of countries. Sometimes the intended political and economic reforms may
conflict. For example, Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) may work
to weaken societies as they reduce the strength of associations
including trade unions. Moreover, the IFIs pay lip service when, in the
name of privatisation, regions and ethnic groups acquire
disproportionate benefits at the cost of grave disadvantage to others.
They have no hard and fast rules to deal with emerging inequality and
conflict. Moreover, they promote the least democratic practice in
economic sphere at times requiring authoritarian dictatorship to impose
measures that reduce people’s chances to participate in economic and
political life. Since such programmes visibly intend to reduce the role
of the state, they make it, in effect, incapable of catering for social
services; and they do so without creating adequate mechanism to deal
with the ensuing problems: growing poverty and inequality, violence and
conflicts, refugee flows, and so on. Their search for an enabling and
lean state, that is nevertheless capable of maintaining law and order,
translates to a search for state that is incapable of proving needed
services but one licensed to terrorise and tax through coercion. Thus,
if taxation without representation is tyranny, it seems that the latter
is what the IFIs want to establish rather than democracy.
Again while democracy in the West is about gradual change, the
proposed shock therapy and stringent adjustment programs require radical
departure from the past. The conflicting approaches to economic reforms
and the focus on the minimalist notion of democracy produce anomalous
outcomes. We now have an impotent state in the face of devastating
health hazards such as the AIDS pandemic and an elite blemished by
incredible corruption in the face of overwhelming poverty and, at times,
famine. We now have a democracy that is not about the needs of the
people but about something else. Since the imposed policies are
unpopular, the state and its institutions are rendered even more
unpopular. To be credible, for example, economic decision-making
institutions (mainly financial institutions such as the national banks)
are expected to insulate themselves from the social and the political
realm. Significant discussions over matters of importance take place
among IFI officials and a handful of finance ministers or heads of banks
without democratic input. When imposed policies fail, those who made the
critical decisions are not accountable, yet that is not what democracy
ought to entail. On the other hand, generations are asked to pay the
“national” debt which dictators and autocrats were allowed to accumulate
while purchasing the means of coercion against their own people. Still
all these are part of the economic and political reform packages which
the people bear, often unsuccessfully thus adding to popular cynicism
and disillusion. The issues are many, and the following characteristics
of postcolonial era contain important dilemmas in the discussion of
multiparty democracy in Africa.
The projection of Western experiences as universal values poses a
danger of de-recognizing the non-Western realities as the former do not
wholly conform to the latter. A few examples relating to the conceptual
values attached to individuals and the notion of minority versus
majority are in order.
The liberalist emphasis on individual and individual rights will
compete and conflict with community ethos of non-Western societies. In
the West, as representative nation-state is strong enough to protect
collective rights, it is perhaps appropriate to focus on the protection
of the rights of individual persons. Without such a state, which is
mainly the case in Africa, the atomisation and individualisation
contributes to the weakening of families and communities. It is
contended that the majoritarian liberal orthodoxy that calls for
individual (but not group) rights can be extremely rigid and conformist.
It overlooks the range of choices available to decision elites and
creates an unwarranted pessimism about the relevance of democracy in
Africa (Rothchild 2000:2).
Moreover there is substantial social stratification in the Western
societies with discernible divisions on the basis of interest,
profession, class, religion, and ethnicity/race/nation. Given the
strength of communication, mobility and education, members of society
enjoy extensive participation in the affairs of their governance through
political parties, civil associations, professional and activist
networks, as well as in advising the state’s decision-making bodies.
Group demands are easily articulated and organised. Competing parties
claim to represent different classes and interest groups. Even then,
problems abound in deeply divided societies like Northern Ireland,
Belgium and Canada where ethno-religious cleavage is stronger than class
division (Hameso 1997a:100).
In reality, the problems are compounded in Africa where most of the
above conditions are not met. In communities and economies based
predominantly on agriculture, where large sections of populations live
in the rural areas, where neither the Western style classes (workers and
capitalists) are significant, the ruling elite remains a minority
whether it is a military or civilian. The floating elite, which
obviously has problems of representation, is damned as parasitic and the
“principal obstacle to qualitative changes in Africa” (Bathily 1994:68).
What is more, under circumstances where the post-colonial state is
based on hegemonic paradigm, the sudden imposition of Western-style
multiparty politics causes anomalous outcomes including conflicts. Today
the ready-made recipes for conflicts are not ideological differences as
much as ethnic differences. Where the multiparty elections take place,
they end up creating ethnic hegemony or alignments with all forms of
irregularities.
This problem relates to yet another illusive notion: minority
versus majority. Since the prominent feature of multiparty politics
is voting, larger groups stand to gain while the smaller groups expect
loss. Where loyalty is not based on class and religion, voting means
choosing people belonging to one’s ethnic group. Such outcomes compelled
a Western scholar to ask: “what is the point of elections if all they do
is to substitute a Bemba-dominated regime for a Nyanja regime in
Zambia?” (Horowitz 1994:48). In heterogeneous and deeply divided
societies, the outcome is the exclusion of minority or even, as we see
later, majority ethnic groups.
The assumption of political competition to complement the ideology of
economic competition means that where politics are a mask for
Westminster style winner-takes-all game, elections exacerbate the
condition of the losers. Excluded groups, irrespective of their minority
or majority status, will be cut off from the possibility of
participation in major decisions affecting their future. As complex
formula of power sharing are not built into majoritarian rule, what is
created is a “single party government as a result of multiparty
elections” (Fortman 2000:86). In Cameroon, for example, President Paul
Biya reigned over a government supported mainly by Beti and Balu but
opposed by the rest of groups. Jerry Rawlings of Ghana was reported to
get a majority vote (93%) from Ewe-dominated area while he received less
than one third in Asante (Horowitz 1994:39). The Tigrean-led minority
regime in Ethiopia, unwilling to face the outcome of free political
participation, opted to stay in power by dint of intimidation,
manipulation and creation of numerous surrogate parties, in effect
forcefully removing the opposition from the scene.
The significance of such outcomes grows further with the prevailing
zero-sum nature of politics. It means the losers face a grim prospect of
permanent exclusion from political power and the resources that emanate
from therein. That is, when a particular group wins, be it a minority or
a majority, the stakes of gain and loss are massive. Defeat means more
than the word since the losing groups will be alienated from vital
political and economic activities. It means they are discouraged from
participation in economic activities through such policy measures as
privatisation, land ownership and taxation. Privatisation measures are
likely to favour a community or an ethnic group in power or the ones
that control the state. If the ruling group in power is from a minority
ethnie, it is likely to resort to authoritarian methods exercising
ruthless social and economic controls while excluding the majority of
population.
Where ideas and principles grounded on the interest of society are
lacking, and where there are deep-rooted ethnic divisions, the
electorate (often non-literate) are provided with two rigid choices:
electing persons that belong to one’s group who speak the same language,
share the same culture, history and prejudice, while deselecting
“others” who are from remote areas, speaking unintelligible languages,
with different cultures, and at times contrasting interpretations of
history. (This is not peculiar to Africa as the same happens to
electoral processes in deeply divided societies of the West). The
situation is complicated in Africa where, as personal rule dominated the
polity for far too long, personalities matter more than a political
organization or its objectives. In Kenya’s elections of 1992 (the same
is true of 1997), for example, opposition parties were divided along
personalities and personal rivalries resulting in the “triumph of the
system” (Throup and Hornsby 1998). These rivalries in turn are related
to historical and cultural factors. Thus it is not uncommon that “under
conditions of free elections, groups in polarized societies will line up
behind ethnically based political parties representing their respective
groups” (Horowitz 1991:96). Even when the parties are trans-ethnic,
multiparty elections are still fraught with ethnic manipulation. As
Kenya’s elections of 1992 and 1997 demonstrate, the KANU party remained
in power by employing a combination of actions. The political system is
characterized by “ethnic voting” as election results reflected
ethno-territorial boundaries (Foeken and Dietz 2000:128). It may be
assumed that this sort of “anomaly” will disappear by banning or
discouraging parties based along ethnic and/or religious lines. Banned
or discouraged, ethnicity continues to exist as a manifestation of
African reality.
It should be noted that multiparty democracy, being a political
culture, needs suitable atmosphere for its promotion. It cannot be
imposed lest it produces a different variety of politics. The culture of
democracy (tolerance of dissent, representation, consultation and
consensus) needs to develop from the grassroots. This stands in stark
contrast to the most recent political culture in Africa which was
characterized by intolerance, discrimination and contempt for a common
person and particularly for “unlettered” rural residents. Reversing
these sort of political attitudes requires time, even generations, as
well as a good measure of education and information about democracy.
Where the social and economic milieu the political actors operate is
qualitatively different from the West, the application of Western style
multiparty politics accompany several problematic issues.
One outcome of the sudden introduction of political competition is
the manipulation of the polity by the incumbent and the opportunists who
take advantage of the loopholes in the “rules of the game” for purposes
of self-aggrandizement and not for the benefit of societies. The common
terms used to describe such problematic outcomes are sham elections,
general selection or rigged elections. In a decade since 1990, only a
handful of party or state leaders emerged as the result of electoral
victory. The few leaders who stepped down include Tanzania’s Julius
Nyerere, Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, South Africa’s Nelson Mandela, and
recently Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings.
In much of the rest of Africa, the story is one of conducting
problematic mutipati (as they would say in Malawi) elections
without initiating substantive changes to the leadership or to the
polity. When changes seem eminent, political protagonists refuse to
accept the outcome as fair. The case of Angola is instructive as
the country switched to civil war shortly after multiparty elections
that were supervised by “international observers” who applauded the
outcome as “free and fair.”
A kind of multiparty fatigue led people to question the
relevance of MPP in African setting. Eritrea’s President Isayas Afewerki
is forthright in arguing that:
“We do not want any absolute or childish democracy, and neither do
we advocate European or US-style democracy which would not be
suitable for our society, because these were established in
circumstances different from what we have gone through Â…. We now
need a political climate which will guarantee stability and the
reconstruction process” (Salih 1999:139).
In power since the new state of Eritrea was created in 1993 and for
nearly two decades as the leader of the Front that delivered
independence, Eritrea’s president is sceptical if any party will be in a
position to maintain both stability and reconstruction. Yet the new
country’s constitution espouses multiparty democracy.
The other immediate outcome of democratisation in the developing
world is its likelihood “to stimulate nationalist conflict when elites
are threatened by rapid political change and when the expansion of
political participation precedes the formation of strong civic
institutions” (Snyder 2000:266). Since political decision-making holds
the key to society’s economic and social resources, the losers lose
almost everything, sometimes even the hope. The win-lose nature of
multiparty competition thus acts as an important element in reducing the
willingness of those in power to concede electoral victory to
opposition. For them, multiparty politics as a recipe for conflict. As
if giving credence to this view, different rounds of multiparty
elections across Africa were punctuated with violence resulting in
violation of human rights and large scale displacement of people. The
political mechanisms that may as well create polities that respect human
rights, produce the very opposite. Today, countries such as Kenya and
Tanzania and many others close to violent conflict zones bear the brunt
of the problems associated with forced displacement of people. Noting
such a tendency, Achille Mbembe wrote:
To deal with the protest movements that have everywhere accompanied
the demand for multi-party politics, most African regimes have given
free rein to the soldiery Â…. They have let these forces collect
their pay from the inhabitants, first under cover of so-called law
and order operations, and then in the everyday administration of
coercion – road blocks, raids, forced tax collection, illegal
seizures, rackets, and a host of special favours (Mbembe 2001:83).
Most notably, in some instances, the intensity of violence has grown
to the level of organized genocide since the introduction of MPP in the
1990s. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 was preceded by multiparty
elections. In Burundi, a country where the Hutus make up 75% of the
population, the Hutu majority elected a Hutu president in April 1993
after the adoption of the multiparty politics. Five months later, he was
killed by Tutsi paratroopers. In an attendant wave of slaughter, some
50,000 people were killed. In January 1994, a replacement, again a
president from Hutu group, was killed in a plane crash along a fellow
Hutu president of Rwanda. In April 1994, the National Assembly again
elected a Hutu as an interim president. On 24 July 1996, he was
overthrown and a Tutsi president was installed (Agyeman 2000:47). Today
the government there still finds it difficult to share power with the
majority Hutu population. Whenever there are tendencies in that
direction, the minority-dominated military moves in or threatens to do
so.
The dilemma of political participation and competitive exclusion is
openly played out in MPP as it relates to the problematic nature of
state and its difficult relations to society and to opposition groups.
Many regimes ban the formation of political parties along ethnic,
religious or regional lines – a practice, which in itself, is in
contravention of the right to freedom of association. Such actions
worked to narrow the scope of political participation and competition.
In the case of Ghana, participation was re-channelled into
state-controlled institutions. The constitutional provisions mandating
decentralized government were withdrawn, presidential powers gradually
expanded, and constitutional checks on the executive branch of
government were removed and one-party rule was imposed (Daddieh 2001).
The disregard to a holistic approach to the process of
democratisation enabled authoritarian single party states to fabricate
surrogate parties to take part in sham elections. As a Norwegian
observers group to Ethiopian elections of May 1995 noted, “if one
alternative is held up as the only loyal one while other alternatives
are suppressed, prohibited or silenced, the debate is not inclusive –
and then the elections are meaninglessÂ… [U]nder such circumstances it
is better to hold no elections at all than to discredit them as a tool
for democracy, thereby discrediting democracy in the people’s minds” (Tronvoll
and Aadland 1994:57).
The Zambian case encapsulated what characterises many multiparty
elections in Africa: “the disqualification of leading candidates, the
spotty coverage of voter registration, the lack of internal democracy in
ruling parties, the abuse of government resources during the campaign,
and the growing hostility of governments toward watchdog groups”
(Bratton 1998: 60). It is also notable that, as the social and economic
goods that multiparty elections produce get scarcer, voter antipathy
grows which is expressed in terms of poor turnouts. Sometimes, elections
are conducted in the absence of voters. Yet, these seemingly
overwhelming problems should not cloud ones outlook on the
democratisation of African polities. If any thing, the widespread
dissatisfaction with multiparty politics in Africa provides the basis
for the search for suitable alternatives that require more, complex
democracy, not less.
The challenge therefore is not only to hold routine general
elections, but it is to produce structural reforms of the polity. This
is particularly the case, since
[t]ied as it is to literacy and an internalised discourse that state
structures are, as they say, by and for the people, democracy cannot
be willed into being in the nation-states that resulted from the
independence struggles of Africa. A state that was founded on
colonial imposition, structured as a bifurcated one – that is, with
‘citizens’ being the elite minority, and ‘subjects’ the teeming
populations held under customary laws – could not pretend for ever
that its structures had any organic handle on ‘the people’ and their
self-understanding. Following this logic, it is consistent that
African countries fail in their attempt at forging democratic
societies, insofar as they retain the structures pointedly forged by
the contingencies of colonial rule (George 2000:7).
This means various alternatives are needed to address the critical
elements left out by the restricted notion of MPP. For Claude Ake, the
democratic participation in African context means the participation of a
society “which is still pre-industrial and communal and whose cultural
idiom is radically different – a society whose members are barely
surviving on informal activities and subsistence farming” (Ake
1993a:239-40). Different approaches have been used in different
countries. The starting point needs to be the historical roots of the
notions of democracy in Africa itself.
I contend that African
countries will continue to be racked by conflicts unless they
develop political cultures consonant with their own traditions and
accept the norm of distributing their countries’ resources
equitably. Dictates about “liberal democracy” only lead to disemia Â…
a condition among local power seekers, who [in] order to please
hegemonies, may either disguise those aspects of social life that
conflict with the hopes of tutelary powers; or create systems out of
phase with local realities; or cynically manipulate local conditions
to gain or remain in power (Skinner
2000:55-6).
Referring to broader vantage, democracy can be viewed as a system
where people participate in vital decisions that affect their lives. But
when powerful countries impose a unique blueprint of democracy and their
values on other societies on the presumption that it is a model fit for
any society, then democracy loses part of its meaning or it becomes an
imposed form of rule.
Noting that democracy is a desirable mode of political interaction,
problem arises as to which specific democratic practice is more suitable
for a social system to adopt or develop. As far as multiparty polity is
concerned, it is noted that “in ethnically divided societies, majority
rule is not a solution; it is a problem, because it permits domination
apparently in perpetuity” Horowitz (1994:46). Ethnic minority groups may
legitimately fear the “tyranny of the majority” whereas majorities
constantly resent a minority rule. (The minority-majority
dichotomy refers here to numeric ethnic minority or majority). Thus, in
ethnically divided societies, liberal democracy can complicate problems.
An American social anthropologist wrote:
I think it is important for you and other Africans to think about
the term democracy which is loosely bantered these days. Ironically,
it seems to me that Americans and Europeans have very limited
concepts of the ultimate meaning of democracy which I take to mean
the achievement of consensus in order to establish and maintain an
optimum of social harmony .... Note that Yuweri Museveni in Uganda
is one of the few African leaders to hold an election towards
consensual agreement by avoiding competitive political parties (John
Hamer in a letter to the author, 7 July 1996).
Postponing the Musevenian approach for later discussion, it should be
said that the search for alternatives takes us to Africa’s own past and
its perception of democracy. The concept of democracy is not alien to
Africa. Pre-colonial African societies had traditional checks and
balances, consultative decision making as the following quote attests:
Traditional African political systems were infused with democratic
values. They were invariably patrimonial, and consciousness was
communal; everything was everybody’s business, engendering a strong
emphasis on participation. Standards of accountability were even
stricter than in Western societies. Chiefs were answerable not only
for their own actions but for natural catastrophes such as famine,
epidemics, floods, and drought. In the event of such disasters,
chiefs could be required to go into exile or ‘asked to die’ (Ake
1993b: 72).
In pre-colonial times, there had been African societies that
understood and adhered to the rituals and structures of democratic
dispensation. One characteristic of these societies is the devolution of
power down to the local units – territorial divisions, clans, lineages,
and extended families, with an individual as a vital member of the
community. These political systems were structured in a hierarchy in
which the basic unit was the family, extended to the levels of lineage,
the clan, on to territorially defined entities. In this participatory
system of governance, decisions were generally reached by consensus and
broad-based consultation through group representation at various levels
(The National Summit on Africa 1998). The following is a social
anthropologist’s account of the possibility of constructing African
democracy:
The study of an indigenous African democracy is a very worthwhile
enterprise, because it is a rich source of ideas that can inspire
and inform constitutional thinkers in Africa. On that foundation of
historic and ethnographical knowledge, we can build genuinely
African democratic constitutions that differ from the borrowed
constitutions of today – alien constitutions people do not care
about and will not defend when they are violated. (Legesse,
2000:xi.)
Much had changed, of course, in the course of colonial rule, which
displaced the above scenario replacing them by colonial rule that was
openly undemocratic. But then who would not extol the virtues of
democratic polities?
The positive dispensation towards democracy is not that it is the
only trade in the town; but as a system it possesses better mechanisms
to handle human nature. The strength of the idea of democracy lies in
the principle of people’s participation in their governance. Democratic
solutions promote a search for balance of power among different branches
of a government. While the formalization of the rules of interaction
eases conflict, the transparency of the system increases trust and
accommodation. This means group identities and cultures face lower
threat. Wider participation also gives a chance for higher quality of
leadership. The system is likely to produce supportive elements such as
a responsive state and expanding educational and economic opportunities.
Democratic regimes tend to be responsive to the collective needs of
society due to periodic changes in governments and personalities. That
is, in order to win periodic votes, governments pay attention to diverse
interests of their constituents. When the ruled are dissatisfied with
the rulers, the latter are peacefully replaced via elections. When
political regimes block such a mechanism, replacement takes violent
forms (Fortman 2000:78-9). It also means that when people cannot change
the rulers peacefully, they invoke different social and political
options.
A healthy democracy needs understandable rules and a level playing
field. The assumption is also that competitive elections promote
political legitimacy and mobilize groups for developmental purposes.
Democratisation has wider appeals especially when linked to such
elements as political representation, consensus, accountability,
transparency and legitimacy. Political representation underlies the
expression of people’s wishes. To gain general acceptance, political
organisations design programs that are relevant to the needs of the
populations. It is also the case that under democratic polities, group
preference and interests restrain certain undesirable government
actions.
The prime pretext for incumbent leaders to undermine the case for
multiparty democracy is that it is a recipe for ethnic conflict. In
deeply divided societies, an alternative to the refusal of
democratisation, be it multiparty politics or adherence to other forms
of participatory principles, implies endless personal rule and decay.
The rebellion against this position calls for democratisation. When
multiparty democracy fails to democratise the state, ethnicity serves as
an alternative organizing principle of social justice and change.
Indeed, there are other persuasive arguments to democratic sides of
ethnicity. Nnoli (1993:222) argues that a kind of ethnic democracy
[c]oncerns the right of the members of each ethnic group to be
secure in their lives and property, as well as secure from arbitrary
arrest and punishment and for them to enjoy equal opportunity in
real terms in trade, business, employment, schooling and the
enjoyment of social amenities. [All these] can only be attenuated by
the consistent application of democratic principles, norms and
values and procedures in socio-economic and political life.
In this sense, ethnicity complements other forms of representation.
This is an important ingredient lacking in the body politics of African
states. Genuine incorporation of ethnicity contributes to democracy,
popular participation and political legitimacy. Ethnicity performs
legitimate political functions and nowhere its positive instrumentality
is important as in divided societies.
One of the positive methods to deal with ethnicity is seeking ways to
boldly represent an otherwise legitimate feeling and reality. Such an
action is palliative for it takes the steam out of abusive and
oppressive post-colonial state. Elliot Skinner states that
without a compromise that would ensure ‘ethnic justice’ neither
so-called ‘liberal democracy’ nor other species of government will
succeed in Africa. If ‘liberal democracy’ presently has any
evolutionary advantages, it will have to adapt to local realities,
and its contours must be shaped by indigenous African socio-cultural
traditions (Skinner 2001:56).
Democracy will have mechanisms to overcome economic discrimination of
ethnic groups and make sure that the rights of ethnic or other
constituent groups are respected. For after all, “democratic governance
is a process for managing intra-state conflict by recruiting people to
high political office through free and fair competitive elections” (Rothchild
2000:3).
Among the contemporary African leaders who openly stated the dilemmas
and problems associated with MPP is Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni.
He believes that Uganda (a country greatly haunted by its past:
dictatorship, failed multiparty politics and protracted guerrilla
rebellion) is not ready for a Western-style multiparty system. The move
to such politics, he notes, leads to animosities and conflict based on
ethnicity. His alternative to MPP is a no-party system also known
as the “Movement system.” The name derives from the National
Revolutionary Movement that brought Museveni to power in 1986. For its
proponents, the system is a broad based, inclusive and non-partisan
framework given to participatory democracy but without competing
parties. In the no-party electoral alternative, competing candidates vie
for votes as individuals and not as members of a party, though most
belong to the ruling NRM (Doornbos 2000:109).
The scepticism regarding MPP is based on discernible pragmatism but
the validity of Movement system depends on whether democratic practices
(such as representation, consensus, accountability and respect for human
rights) are present both within the Movement system and in its
governance of the country. The question is how accountability is
assured, and how political and ethnic minorities express their views on
economic well-being and resource distribution. The apparent danger is if
the arguments for no-party democracy are used to justify the monopoly of
power with the NRM as a ruling party. If that is the case, then
it is no alternative for it is another name for single-party rule.
For its critics, including the Human Rights Watch (1999), the
Movement system already restricts political rights whereas the
government’s repressive measures are overlooked by donors who are
pleased with the country’s performance with economic reforms. The
so-called new leaders, including Museveni, claim that their societies
emerging from war or dictatorship need stability. They are suspicious of
political opposition and they intervene in the affairs of their
neighbours. As for the Movement, it has been in power for over for 15
years and it does not seem to have a decent exit strategy as President
Museveni himself is quoted as saying:
I’m not ready to hand over power to people or groups of people who
have no ability to manage a nation ....Why should I sentence
Ugandans to suicide by handing over power to people we fought and
defeated? It’s dangerous despite the fact that the constitution
allows them to run against me.... At times the constitution may not
be the best tool to direct us politically for it allows wrong and
doubtful people to contest for power. (Addressing a rally in western
Uganda. East African, 12 February 2001)
In other words, the sincerity and the readiness for successful
peaceful transfer of power is questionable. Conflict also continues to
rage in the northern regions of the country without negotiated
settlement on sight. Uganda is also involved in the neighbouring Congo
conflict, and these are hardly the signs of a healthy governance that
can serve as an alternative role model for others.
In African context, where populations are heterogeneous based on
ethnic, religious and language criteria consociational or consensus
model of democracy is increasingly relevant. This is particularly so
since the highly centralized model of governance imposed shortly after
independence has limited the representation of particular ethnic groups
or created a bias in the allocation of resources (Cranenburgh 2000:26).
Additional measures relate to power-sharing arrangements including
the establishment of political and administrative units to suit such
arrangements as federalism, regional autonomy, and autonomous group
rights. That entails incorporating ethnic associations and groups and
their recognition as legitimate political actors. It is noted that “in
multiethnic societies such as Mauritius and Botswana, where ethnic
groups are recognized as legitimate and feel secure about their future,
ethnic politics can be compatible with democracy” (Rothchild 2000:6).
The recognition of group political rights reassures ethnic minorities
about their liberties and security, reducing the incentive for civil
war, secession, and the defence of co-ethnic across their borders (Talbott
2000:160).
So far, incumbent regimes held democracy and peoples at ransom
espousing the need for “national unity” and the proliferation of
conflicts. The very issue of differences and diversity, the very stuff
of democratic participation and negotiation, were used as cases against
participation. The lack of recognition of heterogeneity on the basis of
fear of fragmentation needs to be replaced by an attitude for tolerance
of diversity, as ethnic co-existence requires genuine bargaining rather
than simply majority rule flowing multiparty rule. Moreover, since some
groups had been advantaged at the expense of others, initial affirmative
action or even equal access to education, and the use of ones languages
are necessary in which case the formerly excluded groups and regions
will have meaningful participation in society.
1. The theoretical and historical foundation of competitive, liberal
polity which the West subscribes are understandable but they cannot be
taken for granted everywhere in the world. While the desirability of
democracy and its principles are not contested, problems arise from the
imposition of specific political and social models on different
contexts. Moreover, minimizing democracy to multiparty elections does
disservice to democratisation. While elections of the sort have existed
in many countries since independence, they were mechanisms to confirm
political facts than to remove incumbent. Sham elections whose outcome
were known well before the voting have served as mechanisms for
legitimising existing rule or as institutional façade to attract foreign
aid. Similarly the electoral campaigns since 1990s failed to bring
increased power-sharing or greater economic prosperity (Ellis 2000:43).
Multiparty elections also failed to address the nature of the state
which is undemocratic and repressive in its modus operandi.
2. If anything, the African experience with multiparty democracy
shows the failure of imposed institutions and processes as the result of
existing contradictions arising form Africa’s historical experiences and
post-colonial governance. Since easily identifiable “historic” divisions
of class along Western lines between capital and labour are nearly
absent, the most readily available factors in Africa are ethnicity and
other “invisible” internal dynamics. How well democracy addresses
ethnicity and related factors is far important than electoral events. So
far, neither ignoring ethnicity nor suppressing it worked. If zealous
support is given to uphold the rights of an individual, then that
individual’s right to promote his/her ethnicity should also be
recognized. Suppression of ethnic identity leads to open tension and
mistrust. There is a distinct possibility for ethnicity to be heavily
politicised offering an atmosphere for violence. Therefore
democratisation need to ensure that the political environment is not
threatening to the security and well-being of ethnic groups. It means
ethnic groups and their organizations are represented as legitimate
groups. This can be complemented by multi-ethnic coalition building,
intensive bargaining, and establishment of arrangement for sharing of
rewards. Serious regional and local devolution of power is part of the
democratising project.
3. The relative neglect of indigenous forms of democratic polities
and single-handed imposition of multipartyism as the only option
remained overly rigid. The usefulness of other democratic alternatives
depend on whether basic elements of democratic practice are present. It
is tautological to state that since democracy is about people, the
foundation of democracy should be the people. It means an attempt at
democratisation should emanate from the people. As a social and
political system, or even as a process and part of a culture, it has to
be built from local materials. Without an African initiative and
understanding, multiparty democracy remains an illusion. The point is
aptly made by Larry Diamond who concluded that “it is unrealistic to
think that countries in Africa can suddenly reverse course and
institutionalise stable democratic government simply by changing
leaders, constitutions and/or public mentalities. If progress is made
toward developing democratic government, it is likely to be gradual,
messy, fitful and slow, with many imperfections along the way” (Diamond
1989:24). We also need to acknowledge, following Claude Ake’s trenchant
analysis, that the unique African democracy is not going to be the
replica of the West. It has to grow from the ground and it is going to
be different.
4. The leaders need to appreciate that it is to their best interest
and to that of their citizens to institute democracy in the long term.
Without democratic dispensation, they will have no protection against
their person or their property. Without it, they face violent death,
instantly as happened to Samuel Doe or in exile as Siad Bare and Mobutu
Sese Seko. Without it, they face forced exile and departure from the
country they ruled. Therefore peaceful transition of power does service
to societies and polities. In short, African leaders and states need to
make peace with their people.
5. Finally, external forces that have the wherewithal to facilitate
or retard democratisation should develop critical understanding of the
cultural, historical and even economic specificity of African countries.
These forces include pro-African lobbies, bilateral and multilateral
donors, private foundations, and UN organisations. Double standards and
confusing signals in relation to democracy and development is not
helpful. Some donors have ambiguous and mixed record in democracy
promotion. They need to clarify that democracy involves popular
participation, the supremacy of the rule of law, respect to individual
and collective rights, transparency and accountability in governance,
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reprinted from West Africa
Review
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